

No Trust without Regulation!

The European Challenge on Regulation, Liability and Standards

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Al Safety & Safe RL Workshop – IJCAI2023 – August 21th



• From where I talk...

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From Research to Industry





- Low-carbon energy (nuclear & renewable)
- Digital technology
- Medicine of the future (technology)
- Defence and national security





list Cez **Smart Digital Systems Institute Artificial Digital Trust** 1 000+ Intelligence Society employees Computing 200+ Environnement solutions PhD & Postdocs 200+ Sovereignty industrial partners Industry of the Future

Main CEA List's axes of research in Al





The well-known context...

More and more expectations on trust and frugality

Al is coming with new and huge challenges





ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Efficient and impressing!!!

on elementary task as

- Perception
- Reasoning



No common sense



« Chicken » or « Pedestrian »



« Nothing (recognized) behind? »

- « Known known »
- « Known unknown »
- « Unknown unknown »







Ostrich



Miss-used



Report on Tesla first accident - Recommendation Incorporate system safeguards that limit the use of automated vehicle control systems to those conditions

for which they were designed. (H-17-41)

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• Need of policy

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Outside of Europe: still at stage of recommandations...



www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2022/03/17/AI-RMF-1stdraft.pdf The AI RMF is intended for voluntary use in addressing risks in the design, development, use, and evaluation of AI products, services, and systems.



https://oecd.ai/en/ai-principles

... innovative and trustworthy and that respects human rights and democratic values. (May 2019)

	Our mission Cause areas - Our work - About us -		
Home » Pause Giant AI Experiments: An Open Letter			
Pause Giant Al Experiments: An Open Letter			
We call on all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4.			
Signatures 26157	Add your signature		
PUBLISHED March 22, 20	https://futureoflife.org/open-letter/pause-giant-ai-experiments/		

European approach to ethics and regulation

Expert group analyse the subject of TRUST



Trustworthy AI should be:

 (1) lawful - respecting all applicable laws & regulations
 (2) ethical - respecting ethical principles and values
 (3) robust - both from a technical perspective while taking into account its social environment

7 key requirements:

- Human agency and oversight
- Technical Robustness and safety.
- Privacy and data governance.
- Transparency.
- Societal and environmental well-being.
- Accountability.

European commission vision

2020: Approach for excellence and Trust		
EUROPEAN COMMISSION		
Brussels, 19.2.2020 COM(2020) 65 final		
WHITE PAPER On Artificial Intelligence - A European approach to excellence and trust		

Human-centric AI:

- Al system builder is responsible

 robustness, safety, privacy, transparency...
- Human right must be respected and not subject to automated decision only

Toward a european regulation

2021: Proposal to the parliament
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Brussels, 21.4.2021 COM(2021) 206 final 2021/0106 (COD)
Proposal for a
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
LAVING DOWN HARMONISED RULES ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACT) AND AMENDING CERTAIN UNION LEGISLATIVE ACTS

Europe makes a step forward!

Ethics imperatives & defense

Measure

if your organisation's AI is

trustworthy

A global policy set up by Europe

A complete approach with 3 pilars: regulation, liability, conformity



Toward an European regulation for Al deployment respecting the european values

European Parliament presentation: www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2021)698792 The act (108 pg) : https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206

• A strong European legislation,

(i.e applicable as it is to any system or service provided in any EU country)



Adopted by EU Parliament, on June 14th 2023:
499 votes in favour, 28 against and 93 abstentions
→ Now it goes to each national parliaments



Toward an European regulation: centered on the usage



FORBIDDEN USAGES

COGNITIVE BEHAVIOURAL MANIPULATION

- Al systems that deploy harmful manipulative 'subliminal techniques'
- Al systems that exploit specific vulnerable groups (physical or mental disability)

SOCIAL SCORING & Cie by PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

- Al systems used by public authorities, or on their behalf, for social scoring purposes
- Predictive policing systems (based on profiling, location or past criminal behavior)
- Emotion recognition in law enforcement, border management, the workplace, educational institutions

• REAL TIME & REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION

- "Real-time" and "Post" remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces (except for serious crimes after judicial authorization)
- Biometric categorization using sensitive characteristics (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity, citizenship status, religion, political orientation)
- Untargeted scraping of facial images from internet or CCTV to create facial recognition databases (= violating human rights and right to privacy).



Toward an European regulation: centered on the usage and risk analysis...



Toward an European regulation...



High risk systems



-FOR ALL DOMAINS WITH EXISTING REGULATIONS:

- \rightarrow General principles + requirement of corresponding EU regulations \rightarrow strong req.
- Ex. : transportation, health, energy, toys, lifts...

+ SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS AREAS (requiring registration) as:

- Biometry & person categorization;
- Management of critical infrastructure
- Essential public and private services;
- Education; Employment;

- Recommendation systems (social media >45M users);
- Democratic process influence;
- Law enforcement; Migration etc.;
- Administration of justice;

- For all others (applications not already governed by European legislation) -> self-assessment

Requirements





 $\prime
ightarrow$ continuously maintained during the system life)

Requirements





Should be

technology

agnostic.

Generative AI based applications

- Assess and mitigate possible risks (regarding to the possible uses and contexts of use) (to health, safety, fundamental rights, the environment, democracy and rule of law)
- **Register** the models in the EU database before release on the EU market
- Comply with **transparency** requirements:
 - Disclosing that the content was AI-generated
 - Ensure safeguards against generating illegal content
 - Provide publically detailed summaries of the copyrighted data used for training
 - Provide capabilities measuring and logging resource consumption (over their entire lifecycle)

Challenge is how to adopt a risk oriented approach when usages are not known in advance

Requirements

Limited-risk AI based systems (not based on Generative AI)

- Such as systems that interacts with humans (i.e. chatbots), emotion recognition systems, biometric categorisation systems, and AI systems that generate or manipulate image, audio or video content (i.e. deepfakes) → limited set of transparency obligations:
 - > Interacting with natural persons: ensure natural persons are informed of the AI nature
 - > Disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated







Al liability: a more protective law



The specific characteristics of AI make it particularly difficult to meet the burden of proof for a successful claim (e.g. opacity/lack of transparency, explainability, autonomous behaviour, continuous adaptation, limited predictability)

Adaptation of law to allow for compensation for damages without the need to prove a fault

- > Reduce liability rules uncertainty and risk of legal fragmentation
- Causality not mandatory (except for High Risk AI because they have to provide transparency and thus give the means to establish causality links)

Responsability to the provider of product and services (depending on context of use)

Will depend to impact analysis depending of the risks entailed by the uses

Will depend to quality of development, transparency, effective oversight by natural persons

Trust \rightarrow Certification \rightarrow Regulation \rightarrow Standards



Standards organization



Credits: Henri Sohier, Co-project leader, "AI Trustworthiness characterization", CEN-CENELEC JTC21 WG4

Labelling approach to complete certification





• What about safety?

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TRUST challenge: a set of characteristics



Mastering the process → the specification

Operational Design Domain

 Operating conditions under which a given system is specifically designed to function » (including environmental, time-of-day restrictions)

Various definitions and naming depending on the domains (concept being refined and integrated by the related standards)

 E.g. : SAE J3016, BSI PAS 1883, SAE AIR6988 (2021), {ConOps} EASA (2021), {SOD, OSED, ODD} SAE AS6983 / EUROCAE ED-xxx (Draft 3a – June 2022)

✓ from the <u>outside</u> of the system

Voluntary restriction within which the expected nominal functioning of an AI-based system is ensured.

E.g.: « Very heavy rainfall »

Credits: M. Adedjouma et al. - www.confiance.ai

« Operating conditions under which a given driving automation system or feature thereof is specifically designed to function, including, but not limited to, environmental, geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristic. » SAE-j3016



✓ from the <u>inside</u> of the system

Description of measurable foreseeable operating conditions within which a Al-based component must operate.

E.g.: « Signal variation from rain detection sensor »

ODD definition through Ontology and Analysis

A general domain analysis completed during design



ODD-based Hazard Identification

A **tool-supported framework** to **automate the hazard identification** process using an ontological model and a specification of the AI-based system **ODD**



ODD: Data definition for Machine Learning

Example on ongoing work on dataset collection, labeling, classification vs the ODD



Credits: M. Addejouma, P. Toukam, F.-M. Ngole Mboula et al. – www.confiance.ai



• Formal methods...

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SAFETY: FORMAL METHODS AND AI... ???

Credits: Z. Chihani, www.aisafetyw.org - 2022



What about AI and the hardest = ML: we have been here before...



Performances versus Validation



TESTS

- Performance tests could be safety tests only if they are well defined regarding to the risks and their probabilities...
- What happens when a test fails from a safety point of view?
 → usually we ask to correct it, but it seems not applicable in ML...

The key question is: how are they defined & what is the coverage?

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ML based AI, testing robustness

Goal: evaluate the AI component against perturbations

- Al component as a black box
- Formalised perturbations according ODD
- Automatic test generation (sample)
- Compare output with the expected one
 - E.g: « Metamorphism » (geometric transformation = « any computable math formulae »)

Credits: Z. Chihani, <u>www.aisafetyw.org</u> - 2022







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Metamorphic testing, example

Welding control

How the application is robust against image degradations?

E.g.: evaluate robustness againt luminosity variations





Credits: Confiance.ai - AIMOS - www.confiance.ai/ia-a-epreuve-du-bruit



Proof of safety properties on neural networks

ACAS-XU: a complex problem (15 M of states)→ function as set of 45 connected neural networks

Is tractable through formal methods analysing the NN

E.g. PyRAT: pyrat-analyzer.com



If the intruder is near and approaching from the left, the system advises « strong right ».

Input constraints: $250 \le \rho \le 400$ $0.2 \le \theta \le 0.4$ $-3.141592 \le \psi \le -3.141592 + 0.005$ $100 \le v_{own} \le 400$ $0 \le v_{int} \le 400$

Formal verification of ML based systems

A use case: Detection of mooring line breaks





- 1) Formal verification of safety properties (safe operating domain)
 - → exhaustive computation of input domains for which the system detects failures
- 2) Robustness evaluation of the sensitivity to disturbances on the inputs:
 - Global approach: computation of interval of acceptable perturbations

Credits: Z. Chihani, A. Lemesle et al., pyrat-analyzer.com, https://caisar-platform.github.io/website/

Fake example: always safe with waves under 5 m



Formal methods challenges



They require initial « formalisation » of properties or test objectives (ODD) If properties are not formalised (e.g. « recognize a pedestrian »), we need to go to internal robustness properties (e.g. « metamorphism »)

For global verification : OK with structured data (leading to « small » models)

E.g.: command and control, tabular approaches...

But for « large » models, very huge computation is needed.

They apply well on **local verification** = around a particular data input

E.g.: welding control application, the image size lead to a large NN,

 Practical computation allowed to explore until 5% of variation around any given input data

Research is very active and provides continuously new results to deal with more and more complex AI components

